The conjecture of this paper is that the use of “mafia protection” is normally emplaced in areas with low institutional pressure, where the governmental framework is weak, perceived as exogenous, or for some other reason not able to have an effective control on the territory. The theory is that this “non orthodox / non State protection” has a common nature and can be driven by informal pressures groups in several and different geopolitical scenarios. So, in the Arab etymological sense, “mafia” operates a sort of reductio ad unum and unifying theory of many informal political vectors. Empirically, we will briefly consider the galaxy of different Italian “mafias”¹ ( Mafia, Stidda, Camorra, Ndrangheta and Sacra Corona Unita), some Middle-East non governmental political experiences ( Lebanese Hezbollah paramilitary level ) and Japanese Yakuza. The paper will try to find out similarities and parallels among them at two levels: Framework and praxis.

Keywords: Organized Crime, Social Protection, Terrorism, Affectivity, Mafia, Anthropology

The term mafia has several and sometimes very curious etymologies.

Two very particular tracks of etymologies should be considered in order to identify possible “social aptitudes” and “hidden indicators” that are inside this world.

German Philosopher M. Heidegger said once that “the language is the house of the being”, so a way to penetrate the surface and to reach the essence of mafia -this mysterious term - should be to investigate inside this world beyond the common sense of the term itself

One possibility refers to an acronym and it is signalled by Baltzar Garzòn, the Spanish Judge author of the book “a world without fear” and also famous for his request of extradition for General Pinochet late in the 90’. Garzòn recalls the possible theory of M.A.F.I.A. as the Italian expression for “Morte Alla Francia l’Italia Anela”. The historical explanation goes to a supposed rape of a young Sicilian woman by a French army soldier in medieval times (1282) and the consequent will for a revenge for the rape.

Another very interesting explanation goes to the original etymology of the term recalled by General Pollari², former Director of S.I.S.M.I (Italian External Security Service) .

In this view, Mafia should derive from two arabs terms: Mu + Afa.

Mu meaning is something similar to “wellness, force or bravery”, meanwhile Afa verbal form means “to protect or to preserve”. So the composite term stands for “ the force of protection” and the capability of a man to protect a third (the weak man) from the strong man”.

 “Mu-afa” as a transversal concept : Mafia, Hezbollah , Yakuza. Some Similarities in psychology, etymology and exploitation.

In very different contexts from Italian mafias scenario, Lebanese Hezbollah and Japanese Yakuza have been defined by different authors as very composite and fragmented worlds made of politics, army and welfare system.

The political assessment on Hezbollah and Yakuza is not surely the aim of this paper and every “judgement on value” should be avoided, as Max Weber methodological heritage teaches.

Anyway it appears to be very interesting a sort of comparison between the so-called Italian historical “mafia model” and Hezbollah paramilitary and Yakuza systems, made of different and similar elements:

In a first approximation, two common elements are:

1) A-periodical external and internal “show of forces”;

2) An auto-perceived function of social protection.

The resultant is a sort of “double-sided” identity, where violent actions are the“ dark side”- but they are (or should) be based on a positive original/natural attitude- “protective side”.

In the “social protection” perspective, a sensitive indicator of an immanent and transversal “Mu-Afa principle” should be found out in Japan at the time of Kobe earthquake. In this event over 6,000 persons were killed, 300,000 were made homeless and large parts of the port facilities and other parts of the city were destroyed. In this natural disaster, there was the perceived idea that Yakuza elements were the first to help population hit by the tragic event. Historically, Yakuza appears o have a strong conceptual link with the Arab mafia etymology.

As reported in N. Pollari research, the origin of Yakuza organization goes back to the fall of Japanese feudal system, when several samurai³ became bandits acting in a first period for the poors, then acting just for themselves.

Yakuza etymology indicates a particular numeric combination (8-9-3) that is the worst outcome in a card play called “Hanafuda”. From this fact derives the use of the world as a synonymous of “loser” or “.person without worth”. Because this recall the supposed Samurai original social function of helping the poors, nowadays Yakuza expression is not used in consideration of its ancient origin.

A “politically correct” term used for contemporary Yakuza is just “boryokudan” (the violents).

On a juridical level, Yakuza criminalization came only in 1992, when there were also Yakuza offices and an active participation to Japanese economic life was common. On a political level it is interesting to underline that there was also a supposed link between the Japanese conservative party and Yakuza groups. In particular the party “used” Yakuza in order to contrast the diffusion of left wing political movements among low level workers categories. The political use of informal powers against other emerging and potentially subversive powers has a precedent in Italian mafias experience too. During the 80’ Camorra – Neapolitan Mafia- was indirectly used against Red Brigade elements that kidnapped an high level political exponent. And Hezbollah itself, as political party (so as a formal and well legitimate power) is reported to use the paramilitary level (the informal level) for political purposes. So that the final mixture between formal and informal powers is an invariant, but is not easy to solve logically.

“Mu-afa” between Ideology, Organized Crime and Terrorism: similarities in the praxis

Of course, this is just a side of the coin. On the other hand we have had, especially in Italy, very high tensions and bloody moments in subversive mafia actions: just to mention two, in 1982 Carabinieri General Carlo Alberto Della Chiesa was murdered in Sicily with his wife.

Cardinal Pappalardo, in his speech for the funeral said that “ while in Rome decisions are in progress, Sagunto is conquered by enemies”.

Ten years after, in 1992, Italian judge Giovanni Falcone was murdered with 500 kg of explosive under the highway.

This technique, a sort of massive I.E.D (Improvised Explosive Device) should be considered as paradigmatic in universal eversive mindscape. We just should reflect on the following quotation:

“In our laboratory we made powder which we used as a cap and we invented various devices for exploding the mines at the desired moment. The ones that gave the best results were electric…at the moment an enemy truck passed the weapon was fired to set off the explosion. These techniques can be developed to a high degree. We have information that in Algeria for example tele-explosive mines, that is mines exploded by radio at great distances from the point where they are located, are being used today against the French colonial power”. ( Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, 1961)

Mafia 92’ IED event in Capaci, Sicily, shifted O.C. (Organized Crime) concept to pure subversion and, although limited in temporal window, seems to have strong analogies with recent guerrilla acts in contemporary Iraq and Afghanistan theatres.

In these theatres, a sort of “Capaci- zation”in IED techniques seems to be in progress.

As reported by Italian General Gay, ISAF –NATO Deputy commander at the time of the event “ in the attack against italian soldier Giorgio Langella was used an enormous amount of explosive. The explosive was under the pavment” ⁴.

On the argument, also Italian Senate Defence Committee President Sergio De Gregorio said that “ against attacks with 100 kg of explosive it’s very difficult a defence.” ⁵

From this specific perspective, terrorism and organized crime seem to come to a point of liminality.

Furthermore, in Via D’Amelio (“D’Amelio street”) attack against Paolo Borsellino Judge, 58 days after Capaci attack , we had a sort of RCVBIED (Radio Controlled Vehicle Born Improvised Device), using contemporary terminology.

In Via D’Amelio a Fiat 126 (an Italian common middleclass car) was used, filled with explosive rather than an afghan Toyota Corolla, that is often reported as warning for suicide or radio-controlled explosive in contemporary Afghanistan because of its diffusion.

Italian Ambassador in Teheran Roberto Toscano observed that it is possible to define terrorism non on the basis of its causes. In this sense terrorism is just a way in using violence and not an ideology.

In 1992 Italian Mafia had a strategic objective, trying to force State to go back in criminal policy Therefore we can speak of subversive strategy because in a certain way mafia wanted that State renounce to sovereignty.

In a similar way, many “power brokers” e warlords in Afghanistan today, going against formal institutions, kill afghan policemen and afghan soldiers.

Similarity between these different worlds are not limited in the praxis.

On a psychological basis, Hawala ( Islamic funds transfer system that goes beyond an institutional bank approach) is built on a trust on informal such as the “pizzini” (piece of papers written in order to gice orders in an informal way) by Mafia Boss Bernardo Provenzano are to be considered informal instruments of communication and command. As observed by Interpol, “there is the need of honest people to conduct this illegal business .”

Diego Bolchini

Diego Bolchini holds a degree in Political Science/International Politics. He attended a Training Diplomatic Course in Globalization, Security and Humanitarian Policy carried out jointly by HEI and GCSP in Geneva (Switzerland). He has published for CeMiSS (Italian Military Center for Strategic Studies), Limes (Italian Geopolitical Review) and Intelligence and History Review (J.N. Harris Studies Center) on international subjects.

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